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The Navy has forward staged mission-critical material in Bahrain, Yokosuka, and 
Sigonella to meet immediate customer demand and lower equipment downtime. The aim 
of this research project is to determine the cost effectiveness of forward-positioning 
material in the Fifth Fleet Area of Responsibility and the impact to lead time before and 
after the standup of the Defense Logistics Agency commercially owned commercially 
operated (COCO) warehouse in Bahrain.  
The results indicate that the current forward-staging efforts are saving the Navy 
money and lowering customer wait time. The Navy’s share of the holding cost at the 
COCO warehouse is relatively small when compared to how much money is saved by 
shipping material via surface transportation instead of by expedited air. This is partially 
due to the heavy weight of some of the items listed on the planned stocking list. The lead 
time analysis shows substantial savings in lead time days and even greater improvement 
in lead time categories. We conclude that the 29 percent reduction in overall lead time is 
a direct result of the forward staging efforts in the Fifth Fleet at the COCO warehouse. 
We anticipate additional cost savings and even lower lead times as the warehouse 
becomes fully stocked. 
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The Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), Admiral Jonathan Greenert, has made 
operating forward and maintaining a strategic presence one of his three primary tenets. In 
his 2014 statement before the House Armed Service Committee on the FY 2015 
Department of the Navy Posture, he emphasized that the Navy will continue to operate 
forward by forward basing, operating, and stationing ships in the Asia-Pacific, Europe, 
and Middle East (Department of the Navy, 2014, p. 6). In order to meet the CNO’s 
mandate, mission-critical and high-demand material must also be forward staged to 
support the forward operating forces and maintain a war fighting capability. This is an 
ongoing effort and requires the coordination of multiple key stakeholders to ensure 
success and complete mission objectives. There have already been several efforts to 
increase forward staging of critical items in the Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh Fleet areas of 
responsibility (AOR). As of September 2013, there have been 7,500 line items forward 
positioned in Bahrain, Yokosuka, and Sigonella (Mazzarella, 2013). Forward staging 
efforts in the Fifth Fleet AOR have been the most robust of the various fleets and these 
efforts will be the focus of this analysis. We do not analyze any demand or shipment data 
for the Sixth or Seventh Fleet AORs in this paper.  
This project will answer the following research questions: 
 Are the current policy and courses of action the U.S. Navy has taken to 
forward stage material in the Fifth Fleet AOR saving them money? 
 What is the impact on lead time of the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) 
commercially owned commercially operated (COCO) warehouse in 
Bahrain?  
B. CURRENT POLICY 
In response to the CNO’s mandate, the Naval Supply Systems Command 
(NAVSUP) created policy and procedures contained in NAVSUPINST 4440.192 for 
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forward positioning naval material outside of the United States. The intention of this 
policy is to: 
1. Improve fulfillment and customer service delivery performance of 
transiting, scheduled deployment and forward deployed naval 
forces. 
2. Optimize safety stock and total supply chain investment 
3. Align inventory for supply chain planning and operations to drive 
cost efficiencies. (Naval Supply Systems Command, 2013, p. 2) 
The first intention lays out what forces and units will be directly affected by the 
efforts. There are several types of units permanently stationed in Bahrain including mine 
counter measure (MCM) ships and patrol craft (PC) that will be considered when forward 
staging items. There are also units deploying in (or deployed to) the Fifth Fleet AOR 
including carrier air wings, ballistic missile defense (BMD) ships, and ground forces such 
as explosive ordinance disposal units and mobile diving units. Finally, the first intention 
addresses units that might be transiting the AOR. Most of the units that fall into this 
category will be transiting the Red Sea either to the Mediterranean Sea or to the Indian 
Ocean. Appendix A shows the geographical boundaries of the Fifth Fleet AOR. 
The second intention focuses on ensuring appropriate inventory levels are on hand 
to meet customer needs while optimizing the supply chain assets. It is important to 
identify the key items that must be stocked and available to customers in order to 
minimize operational down time of equipment. It is also important to optimize supply 
resources such as warehouse space and shipping container space. 
The third intention is concerned with ensuring the inventory levels are set to the 
most cost effective quantities while providing planners the appropriate information to 
make decisions. It is important to have the right items on hand to meet customer demand 
for mission-critical items, but having too much of an item on hand or items that require 
special handling and storage can quickly drive up costs. There is a risk involved with 
having too few of an item on hand, but the forward staging efforts are designed to 
minimize this risk while saving the most amount of money and driving cost efficiencies.  
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The instruction states actions and responsibilities for subordinate commands, 
NAVSUP Global Logistics Support (GLS) and NAVSUP Weapon Systems Support 
(WSS), involved in forward staging and policy initiatives. It is the responsibility of 
NAVSUP, Assistant Commander for Supply Operations and Logistics Policy (N3/4), to 
guide and monitor all subordinate stakeholders and ensure they meet all requirements 
outlined in the instruction (Naval Supply Systems Command, 2013, p. 4). A list of key 
players and stakeholders in developing and implementing Fifth Fleet forward staging 
initiatives are listed below. Note that all support organizations are responsible for 
monitoring costs as well.  
 Combined Task Force (CTF 53)–CTF 53 is primary concerned with all 
logistics at sea in the AOR. This would include coordinating replacement 
shipments as well as transporting mission-critical items from Bahrain to 
the requesting unit. 
 Defense Distribution Center (DDC)–DDC is concerned with getting the 
requested national item identification number (NIIN) from their 
distribution centers to the appropriate area of debarkation.  
 Defense Depot Navy Detachment, Bahrain (DDNB)–DDNB has the 
primary responsibility of managing the forward staged items and 
replenishing as needed. 
 Defense Logistics Agency (DLA)–DLA developed the EMQ model and is 
concerned with what items will be forward staged and ensuring there is 
proper space and facilities to house the items. DLA manages the forward 
staged items on behalf of the Navy. 
 General Services Administration (GSA)–GSA’s role is to coordinate with 
NAVSUP and DLA to determine what GSA-managed items will be 
forward staged. 
 Military Sealift Command (MSC)–MSC is primarily concerned with 
transporting requested replenishments via MSC assets. 
 NAVSUP GLS–GLS coordinates with DLA and MSC to establish load 
lists. They also manage the NIIN selection process for special 
requirements code (SRC) items.  
 NAVSUP Headquarters (HQ)–HQ is overall in charge of creating policy 
and procedures for forward positioning naval material. In addition, they 
manage the service wide transportation (SWT) and Navy Working Capital 
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FundSupply Management (NWCF-SM) accounts (Department of the 
Navy, 2009, p. 7). 
 NAVSUP WSS–WSS Manages the repair parts for naval weapon systems 
and is critical in determining what items will be forward stocked and 
ensuring that there is full asset visibility. 
 Transportation Command (TRANSCOM)–TRANSCOM is responsible for 
all military transportation. 
Fleet commanders also have an influence on which items are forward staged to 
meet specific requirements. These commands include Pacific Fleet, Submarine Force 
Atlantic, Surface Force Atlantic, the Navy Expeditionary Combat Command and Naval 
Forces Central Command. The instruction dictates the joint supply alignment business 
rules. These rules bring key logistical agencies including DLA, GSA, Combatant 
Commanders (COCOM), and TRANSCOM together in order to determine the most 
practical and efficient way to dispense supplies and parts to naval forces OCONUS. It is 
critical that all major players agree to and follow the same business rules in order to 
prevent duplication of effort and more importantly that the right material gets selected 
and forward staged. 
Forward positioning efforts will be evaluated continuously by NAVSUP to look 
for and identify process improvements. It is the responsibility of each stakeholder to 
follow all prescribed procedures and monitor forward staging costs as needed. NAVSUP 
requires an annual forward positioning analysis be conducted for the Third, Fifth, Sixth, 
and Seventh Fleet AORs; however, there is currently no guidance on how to conduct this 
analysis and what information should be provided (Naval Supply Systems Command, 
2013, p. 3). 
C. BUDGETARY ENVIRONMENT 
The defense budget has been on a steady decline since 2010 (Department of 
Defense, 2014). Figure 1 depicts a timeline for defense spending since 1950, based in 
2015 dollars. There is a discernable trend of high peaks during the height of a war or 
armed conflict followed by a sharp decline once the conflict is over. There is no surprise 
then that there was steady decline in spending after the United States pulled troops out of 
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Iraq and Afghanistan in 2011. The Department of Defense estimates that by FY19 the 
defense budget would have decreased by 27 percent compared to FY 10 (Department of 
Defense, 2014). Although this would not be the largest drop in defense funding after an 
armed conflict, the decline is still a substantial amount and will put fiscal and budgetary 
constraints on defense spending.  
 
Figure 1.  Defense Budget History (from Department of Defense, 2014) 
Not only is defense spending decreasing because the United States is no longer 
fighting a major armed conflict, but also because the Budget Control Act of 2011 was 
enacted (Korb, Hoffman, & Blakeley, 2014). The Budget Control Act put a cap on 
discretionary spending through FY21 with each year’s cap increasing by two percent. In 
2013, the Bipartisan Budget Act was passed and increased the defense spending caps to 
$520 billion in FY14 and $521 billion in FY15 (Korb et al., 2014). 
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There is also a growing trend of decreasing Overseas Contingency Operation 
(OCO) funding which the military has come to rely on to maintain its current operational 
tempo and is separate from the baseline budget (Korb et al., 2014). OCO funding is not 
subject to spending caps and there is some concern that in order to meet mission needs 
the Department of Defense might use OCO funding for baseline requirements (Korb et 
al., 2014). The military has come to rely on the contingency funding to pay for items that 
should have been included in their baseline budget (Korb et al., 2014). Figure 2 shows the 
contingency funding levels since 2001. The height of the OCO supplemental was in FY 
2008. Since then, OCO funding has been decreasing, which is forcing the United States 
military to make some tough decisions on cutting programs and reducing budgets. The 
reduction in funding is also forcing the military to find cost efficiencies whenever 
possible.   
 
Figure 2.  FY 2015 Budget Request  
(from Department of Defense, 2014) 
  7
There is high competition for funding among various government agencies and, to 
worsen the situation, the Navy has to compete with the other defense services. As the 
Navy’s budget decreases, decisions must be made as to the best use of funds while 
meeting the strategic goals and requirements of the President, Secretary of Defense, and 
the CNO. One of the CNO’s goals is maintaining a forward presence overseas 
(Department of the Navy, 2014). The current forward staging policy and efforts are 
meeting this requirement; however, because of recent budget cuts, the policy and efforts 
must be re- examined to determine if they are the most cost effective courses of action.  
D. NAVY REQUISITION PROCESS AND IDENTIFICATION 
While afloat forces are outside of the United States territorial waters, the first 
point for resupply for items not carried or out of stock in the ships’ organic inventory is 
material positioned on combat logistics force (CLF) ships. CLF assets can carry several 
categories of items to include fleet issue load list (FILL), high usage load list (HULL), 
and deck load items (Naval Supply Systems Command, 1997, pp. 1–24). FILL items are 
based off projected demand requirements to satisfy 85 percent of deployed force 
requirements (Naval Supply Systems Command, 1997, pp. 2–77). It is the responsibility 
of the AOR Combat Logistics Officer (CLO) to determine if the requisition will be filled 
by CLF assets or cancelled and require the requesting activity to submit the request to 
CONUS activities. There was an incentive for requesting activities to circumvent the 
CLO because of the possibility of having to resubmit the requisition, so most requesting 
activities would submit the requisition directly to CONUS (Mazzarella, 2013, p. 1). If the 
priority of the requisition is high, then the item would be shipped via air transportation 
and thus incur a higher transportation cost than if the item was filled by a CLF asset. This 
is one reason why the Navy has been incurring high shipping costs. NAVSUP has 
identified the circumvention as an unnecessary cost increase. To mitigate the chance of 
the policy not being followed, they have given the CLO permission to forward the 
requisition to ashore activities without canceling it. In addition, NAVSUP is in the 
process of developing a way for CTF-53 to monitor and enforce this submission 
requirement (Mazzarella, 2013, p. 1). By forward positioning more material, it will 
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increase the number of requisitions the CLO can fill with material located at DDNB and 
via CLF assets. Prior to the forward staging initiative only 18 percent of the requisitions 
were screened by the CLO however as of April of 2014 62 percent of the requisitions 
were screened by the CLO (Naval Supply Systems Command, 2014, p. 2). 
Prior to the Fifth Fleet forward staging efforts, most requisitions that could not be 
filled by CLF ships were forwarded to CONUS activities to be filled. The primary reason 
to forward the requisition to CONUS activities is that OCONUS sites were not equipped 
and did not have material on hand to fill the requisitions. The need for forward presence 
with a high fleet readiness while minimizing costs dictated that selected NIINs be 
forward staged. It should be noted that aviation material does not have to be filled by 
CLF ships firsts (Naval Supply Systems Command, 1997, pp. 1–23). Rather, aviation 
material should be filled by the closest activity. This is another reason for the importance 
of forward staging material; it will ensure that aviation requirements are filled 
expeditiously.  
As mentioned earlier the items at the DDNB warehouse are managed by DLA. 
DLA works very similar to a fleet logistics center (FLC) in that they manage and 
distribute material for the Navy; however, DLA manages common use items for all 
military services. They manage nearly all consumable material for the military and nearly 
85 percent of the military’s spare parts. Requisitions that they fill typically come from 
one of 25 distribution centers worldwide (Defense Logistics Agency, 2014). 
Approximately 60 percent of the integrated Navy supply system items are managed by 
DLA (Naval Supply Systems Command, 1997, pp. 1–28). DLA plays a critical role in 
filling requisitions with assets that a FLC cannot provide, both CONUS and OCONUS.  
The priority of the requisition will generally determine the speed in which the 
FLC and DLA fill a requisition. The priority code is constructed from the force activity 
designator (FAD) and the urgency of need designator (UND). The FAD is a rating of the 
military importance of the requesting activity. The FAD ranges from FAD I, which is for 
the highest importance and assigned by the Secretary of Defense, to FAD V which is for 
the lowest importance activities. All naval forces deployed or operating in the Fifth Fleet 
AOR will be in a FAD II, and activities must use their appropriate FAD when ordering 
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material (Naval Supply Systems Command, 1997, p. 46). It is important for material to be 
available and relatively close for forces in FAD II because of their operation tempo and 
strategic importance. 
The second factor that determines the overall priority of the requisition is the 
UND. The UND is assigned by the requesting activity and is a measure of the importance 
of the requested item to the activity’s mission readiness. The UND ranges from ‘‘A,’’ 
which is for immediate requirements, to ‘‘C,’’ which is for routine requirements. Each 
UND has a set of criteria that must be met in order for the requesting activity to use the 
designator (Naval Supply Systems Command, 1997, pp. 3–49). For example, UND ‘‘A” 
should only be used for material that is preventing the activity from performing one of its 
primary missions or if the material is associated with an “anticipated not operationally 
ready supply” (ANORS) requisition or a “not operationally ready supply” (NORS) 
requisition, also known as a casualty report (CASREP) (Naval Supply Systems 
Command, 1997, pp. 3–49). 
Once both the FAD and UMD have been identified, the priority will be assigned 
to the requisition utilizing Table 1. 
Table 1.   Priority Designator (from Naval Supply Systems Command,  
1997, p. 3-53) 
Urgency of Need Designator  FAD 
I II III IV V 
 
A        Unable to Perform 
Priority Designator 
01 02 03 07 08 
B         Performance Impaired 04 05 06 09 10 
C         Routine 11 12 13 14 15 
 
In addition to using the above priorities, requesting activities can use the code 999 
in place of the required delivery date. The code 999 informs the entity filling the order, 
whether it is FLC or DLA, that the requesting activity wants the most expeditious 
handling possible. The use of 999 is restricted to those requisitions involving 
ANORS/CASREPS that must be filled within 15 days of actual combat requirements or 
  10
five days for all other worldwide requirements (Naval Supply Systems Command, 1997, 
pp. 3–31). In addition, the requesting activity must be a Navy force overseas or within 
30 days of deployment overseas. The required delivery date of 777 can be used in 
situations that  do not qualify for the use of 999, but the item has been assigned a priority 
of 04–08 and requires expeditious handling (Naval Supply Systems Command, 1997, 
pp. 3–56).  
Acquisition advice codes (AAC) also play a factor in how and under what 
restrictions an item will be acquired. AACs fall into one of three categories either by 
requisition, by fabrication or assembly, or by local purchase. This study is concerned with 
items that have an AAC of C, D, J, V, and Z. See Appendix B for selected AAC 
definitions.  
The Airlift Clearance Authority (ACA) controls the movement of air-eligible 
material and plays a large role in determining the mode of transportation for a given 
shipment. ACA manages an airlift challenge program which questions and validates air 
shipment requests based off a set of criteria. If the request exceeds one of the set criteria 
then it will be challenged and either be shipped via surface transportation or the 
requirement will need approval for air shipment from a higher echelon command. This 
process is in place to prevent misuse of the military transportation system and to lower 
the cost to transportation funds. High priority requisitions like those that are filling 
CASREPs in the Fifth Fleet are exempt from several of the challenge criteria which can 
lead to high transportation costs associated with these requisitions.  
E. TRANSPORTATION FUNDS 
There are two major funds that are associated with transporting NIINs: the Navy 
Working Capital Fund–Supply Management (NWCF-SM) and the Service Wide 
Transportation (SWT) fund. The Navy uses both accounts regularly, but depending on the 
NIIN’s classification, one account will be charged for a shipment instead of another. 
Below each fund is defined per the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations Instruction 
4600.24D. 
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1. NWCF-SM material pertains to consumable and repariable spare and 
repair parts managed by NAVICP under odd Cognizance Symbol (COG) 
symbols and purchased by a revolving fund account. 
Transportation costs associated with shipment of NAVICP odd managed 
material from DLA distribution depots to CONUS and OCONUS Point of 
Debarkation (POD) is initially paid by DLA, and then reimbursed by 
NWCF-SM. Material movements from the OCONUS POD to the end user 
are paid by the requisitioner, not NWCF. 
2. SWT is a NAVSUP Second Destination Transportation (SDT) centrally 
managed Operation and Maintenance, Navy (O&MN) account with a 
discrete line in the Navy budget. The account was established to provide 
transportation funding for Navy cargo and mail movement that is clearly 
not the responsibility of an end use activity. (Department of the Navy, 
2009, p. 8) 
Depending as to whether the NIIN is an even or odd COG, and in what situation 
the item is being shipped, will determine which account to use. In general, shipment of 
even COG material, also known as appropriated purchases account (APA) material, 
should be charged to the SWT account while odd COG material, also known as 
Navystock account (NSA) material, should be charged to the NWCF-SM or the 
Transportation Account Code (TAC) of the Navy stock point issuing the material. Items 
being shipped from CONUS directly to the end user get charged to the SWT fund. 
F. CURRENT FORWARD-STAGING PROCESSES 
DLA uses an EMQ model in selecting the most cost effective NIINs to forward 
stage. The model is based on a variation of the Economic Order Quantity (EOQ), which 
minimizes the ordering costs and inventory holding cost for each NIIN (Defense 
Logistics Agency, 2013, p. 4). The model compares whether it is less expensive to ship a 
NIIN via surface transportation and manage at a forward distribution point or if it is more 
economical to hold the NIIN CONUS and ship via air transportation either by military air 
through TRANSOM or via a commercial carrier such as FEDEX or DHL express. These 
commercial carrier shipments and international small parcel shipments are also referred 
to as worldwide express shipments. The EOQ was customized by DLA to focus on the 
holding, handling, and transportation costs. 
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The selection process for DLA managed NIINs begins with a threshold 
requirement for the items to have four demand hits in two separate months over one year. 
By making this a requirement, DLA prevents dead stock that could take up valuable 
space and have high holding costs. The second criterion to be eligible is the NIIN must 
have a weapons systems essentiality code (WSEC) of 1–the item is needed to keep the 
system from failing, 5–personal safety, 6–the item is needed for a legal requirement or 
climatic requirement, or has a weapons systems designator code (WSDC) of 21N-Navy 
Reactor. In addition, the item must fall into classes of supply of II (Clothing and Textile), 
III (Petroleum, oil, and liquids), IV (Construction and equipment), VII (Medical), and IX 
(Repair parts). NIINs are reviewed monthly for consideration to be stocked (Defense 
Logistics Agency, 2013, p. 1). 
The next step in the process is to identify any NIIN candidate that is restricted 
from being stored or managed due to the storage or operational capabilities of the depot. 
Any item that cannot be physically stored and managed at the forward distribution point 
(FDP) will be thrown out of consideration (Defense Logistics Agency, 2013, p. 3). 






    
where: 
Dmd = Demand = the Manugistics software forecast (annualized); if the forecast 
is not available, then Demand = Manugistics software history (annualized) 
 
Co = the cost to order; which for the replenishment model is the net landed cost 
(NLC) rate to pick/pack/ship/receive/put-away; based on each item’s weight band 
and handling characteristics 
 
Ch = the cost to hold one dollar of inventory for one year–expressed as a 
percentage; the NLC blended rate used for OCONUS is 18 percent 
 
Cp = the per unit price of the item. 
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Once the number of replenishments and frequency has been determined, the NIIN 
will be assigned two Pareto codes based off two separate processes. The first process 
involves using extended weight as a significant factor of cost. The NIINs are sorted by 
weight in descending order, a cumulative extend weight is calculated, and then a 
cumulative percentage of weight is calculated. The Pareto category value is then assigned 
as follows: 
1. “A” Items = those items whose cumulative percentage is from zero  
(0 percent) up to, but not including 70 percent 
2. “B” Items = those items whose cumulative percentage is equal to  
70 percent up to, but not including 85 percent 
3. “C” Items = those items whose cumulative percentage is equal to  
85 percent up to, but not including 95 percent 
4. “D” Items = those items whose cumulative percentage is equal to  
95 percent up to 100 percent, thus capturing the remaining items. (Defense 
Logistics Agency, 2013, p. 5) 
The second Pareto code assigned is based off material requisition order (MRO) 
count. The NIINs are sorted by MRO count in descending order, a cumulative MRO 
count by item is calculated, and then a cumulative percentage of total MRO counts by 
item is calculated (Defense Logistics Agency, 2013, p. 5). The Pareto category value is 
then assigned as follows: 
1. “A” Items = those items whose cumulative percentage is equal to zero  
(0 percent) up to, but not including 70 percent 
2. “B” Items = those items whose cumulative percentage is equal to  
70 percent up to, but not including 85 percent 
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3. “C” Items = those items whose cumulative percentage is equal to  
85 percent up to, but not including 95 percent 
4. “D” Items = those items whose cumulative percentage is equal to  
95 percent up to 100 percent, thus capturing the remaining items (Defense 
Logistics Agency, 2013, p. 5) 
The overall Pareto code that is assigned to an item will be the higher of the two 
codes. The calculated fill rate is determined based of the final Pareto code assigned 
(Defense Logistics Agency, 2013, p. 5). Below are the fill rate targets: 
1. “A”–Fill Rate Target = 95 percent 
2. “B”–Fill Rate Target = 85 percent 
3. “C”–Fill Rate Target = 70 percent 
4. “D”–Fill Rate Target = 50 percent 
The last step requires the NIINs selected to pass a cost comparison between the 
total costs to forward stage the NIIN to the cost to ship the item via air transportation 
from CONUS. The total cost of forwarded staging is comprised of the surface shipping 
cost per pound, the handling costs to replenish the OCONUS inventory, and the holding 
costs based off the EMQ contribution. Whichever cost is lower will determine if the NIIN 
is recommended for forward staging or not. DLA policy dictates that the item must be at 
least $500 more cost effective at the FDP to be added to the planned stock list (PSL) 
(Defense Logistics Agency, 2013, p. 6). Appendix C lists the additional calculations, 
definitions, and assumptions DLA used in creating their model. 
The Navy also has a SRC process described in NAVSUP instruction 4440.192 
that complements the EMQ model and will provide a recommendation for selected NIINs 
to be forward positioned. Items that are designated with a SRC will have inventory levels 
based off the Enterprise Business System (EBS) unless the parameters are manually 
overridden. Even though these items were not selected by the EMQ process, they are 
considered by the Navy to have a significant impact on the readiness of forward deployed 
units. If the requested item inventory is based off historical data, then levels will be 
calculated with DLA’s EBS, and if the item inventory is based off anticipated demand, 
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then the Navy will request specific inventory levels (Naval Supply Systems Command, 
2013, p. 11). 
The Navy SRC process is shown below: 
 Coordinate with applicable COCOM, TYCOM, or regional partner prior 
to analysis 
 Pull 12-months of demand for specific theater / platform (meets 4-2-12 
rule) 
 Remove all recorded demand with bad COGS, cancelled requisitions, 
forms, pubs, etc. 
 Filter on all records that are “W,” “G,” 777, 999, IPG1, or IPG2 
 Select all NIINs ordered by two or more UICs in AOR 
 Determine if NIINs are carried in CARGO 
 Pull weight, cube and cost data for transportation analysis…if hazmat, pull 
HMIC 
 Ensure NIINs have valid WSDC 
 Retain NIINs with AAC of C, D or Z. Assess AAC J and V for demand 
history 
 Remove NIINs already carried on DLA PSL or WSS OCONUS stocking 
list 
 Segregate NIINs into DLS, GSA and WSS categories 
 Forward recommended NIINs to COCOM, TYCOM, or regional partner 
 Forward recommended NIINs to DLA/WSS/GSA for approval 
 Forward approved DLA/GSA NIINs to WSS code 08 
 Forward approved WSS/GSA to DLA for compatibility check at 
applicable OCONUS Depot 
 Monitor implementation and effectiveness via monthly scorecard. (Naval 
Supply Systems Command, 2013, p. 15) 
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The SRC selection criteria can be modified and adapted as necessary to 
accommodate different situations such as AOR specific requirements or unique items 
such as hazmat. Once the list of all SRC NIINs is created, it is worked by the National 
Account Manager (NAM) and J-332 Stock Positioning if the extended money value of 
the recommended SRC additions are less than $250K. For lists greater than $250K but 
less than $500K, it will be worked by the respective supply chain. If the extended value 
of the list is greater than $1M, then it will be approved at the Enterprise Operations 
Planning Council (EOPC) level (Naval Supply Systems Command, 2013, p. 16). 
The end result of the DLA EMQ and Navy SRC process is the creation of a PSL. 
The PSL will contain the entire site specific NIINs that have met the required 
criteria/thresholds and are recommended for forward staging. The list will also contain 
any item that has been classified a SRC and passed the SRC process. The PSL is site 
specific and will vary from operating area to operating area. By letting PSLs vary, it 
allows for different mission sets to be accomplished in different AORs. For example, the 
Bahrain PSL is the only listing that contains NIINs associated with mine countermeasure 
ships and patrol crafts. The NIINs identified by the EMQ model will be reviewed 
monthly, and items that have not met the EMQ criteria for more than one year will be 
removed. The SRC items will be reviewed annually for retention on the PSL (Naval 
Supply Systems Command, 2013, p. 16). 
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II. DATA COLLECTION 
For this analysis, we required data that covered at least two years and included 
data before the standup of the DDNB warehouse and after. We required a list of the 
NIINs, their weights, size, and cost shipped from DLA for both surface and air 
transportation to Bahrain. In addition, we required the Navy’s portion of the historic 
holding cost at the DNNB. Finally, we required the demand data for all NIINs 
requisitioned in the Fifth Fleet AOR to include order and ship dates, mode of 
transportation, weight, and size of the NIIN. We obtained our data from DLA and 
NAVSUP. All data sets were in Excel format, and our available computers had the 
necessary power to conduct all filtering requirements and calculations. In the next several 
sections, we will describe our data. 
A. AIR SHIPPING COST DATA 
Shipping cost data was obtained from DLA. The data includes all historic air 
transportation costs to send required items from a DLA distribution point CONUS to 
Bahrain. The data set contains 225,120 individual air shipments over the months  
of March 2012 to February 2014. There were a total of 137,094 shipped via DHL,  
10,304 shipped via FEDEX, 67,399 shipped via United Parcel Service (UPS),  
10,192 items shipped via military airlift, and 131 shipped via MWA, see Figure 3 for 
shipment percentages. Shipping through DHL comprised more than half of the total 
shipments. The items were shipped from all around the United States. The three most 
frequent points of origin include Susquehanna, Pennsylvania, Norfolk, Virginia, and San 
Joaquin, California. Shipping weights ranged from .01 to 3,606 pounds. The package 
sizes ranged from 0 to 216 cubic feet. If an item was listed at 0 cubic feet it meant the 
package was smaller than .1 cubic foot. Charges ranged from $8.23 to $9,924. The 
shipments arrived at the Bahrain International airport and then transferred to Manama or 
Muharraq. There are several data points that were removed from the data set because they 
did not meet the criteria of being listed on the Bahrain PSL. Some examples include 
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items that had all zeros for NIINs and nomenclatures in the place of the NIIN column. In 
order to filter the data, we used the PSL for each month against the shipping data for that 
month.  
 
Figure 3.  Percentage of Shipments by Carrier (after DLA, 2014) 
B. SURFACE SHIPPING COSTS 
Historic shipping costs could not be provided because individual NIINs could not 
be broken out using the TRANSCOM Ocean data; however, a list of NIINS, their 
corresponding weights, and year shipped was provided by DLA. This data set includes 
6,229 requisitions with the heaviest NIIN weighing 244,015 pounds and the lightest 
weighing one-tenth of a pound. Because individual historic costs are not available, we 
will be using the average dollar per pound surface shipping rate for container shipments 
from CONUS East Coast to Bahrain which was received from DLA. This rate has been 
steadily decreasing over the last three years, from $.79 per pound in FY12, to $.71 in 
FY13, and $.58 in FY14, respectively. This is a $.21 decrease per pound and a 36 percent 
decrease from the FY12 rate. The rates were obtained from DLA using Global Air 
Transportation System (GATES) surface shipment history and Surface Deployment and 
Distribution Command (SDDC) published container general cargo billing rates. The rates 
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will be multiplied by the weights given in the surface shipment data in order to 
approximate the surface shipping cost. We plotted the shipping weights over time to see 
if there were any trends with heavier objects being shipped prior or during the standup of 
the DDNB COCO warehouse, see Figure 4. There does appear to be an increase in 
weights in 2013, which coincides with the standup of the COCO warehouse and the fact 
that the DLA EMQ model was created in early 2013, which favors heavier NIINS. 
 
Figure 4.  Surface Shipping Weights Over Time (after DLA, 2014) 
C. HOLDING COST DATA 
The holding cost data was acquired from DLA. The data set includes the total 
forward stocking charges for the DDNB warehouse and the Navy’s portion of the 
stocking and handling charges. The data does not include any financial opportunity costs. 
The data ranges from March 2012 to February 2014. The total charges per month range 
from $17,018 to $674,138 and the Navy’s portion ranges from $2,443 to $54,089. In 
aggregate, the Navy’s share is approximately 10 percent of the total forward stocking 
charges. In addition, the data is limited to those shipments billed under forward stocking 
to support DDNB. The Navy’s portion of the holding costs is based on the monthly 
billing percentage. We plotted the total DDNB holding cost with the Navy’s portion from 
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March 2012 to February 2014, see Figure 5. The data shows that the Navy has 
consistently paid only a small portion of the holding cost. Even with the significant spike 
from February 2013 to June 2013, the Navy’s portion only increased a moderate amount. 
The large spike is primarily due to the standup of the DDNB COCO warehouse. In 
addition, the Navy’s portion appears to follow the trend of the total holding cost; 
however, it is not nearly as volatile from month to month. 
 
Figure 5.  The Navy’s Portion of DDNB Holding Costs  
(after DLA, 2014) 
D. FIFTH FLEET PLANNED STOCK LIST 
DLA provided a CY12, CY13, and CY14 DDNB PSL. Each PSL contains 12 
months of data, with the exception of CY14, which only had three months. The PSLs 
from January 2012 to March 2013 lists NIINs that were selected using DLA’s EMQ 
model. In April 2013, the PSLs began including NIINs selected by the Navy’s SRC 
selection process. The NIINs listed with a SRC also comment on the military platform 
the NIIN primarily affects and the NIIN’s associated supply chain. The platforms 
affected included BMD, PC/MCM, PC unique and MCM unique. The supply chains 
affected include land, construction and equipment, maritime, and aviation. We combined 
  21
all PSLs onto one spreadsheet and then removed any duplicate NIINs. There are 4,692 
unique NIINs that have been listed on various PSLs from March 2012 to February 2014. 
Figure 6 lists the quantity of NIINs on the PSL each month. There is a steady increase in 
quantity which can most likely be attributed to the growing demand to forward stage 
parts and the fact that DLA now has ten times more space to warehouse items.  
 
Figure 6.  Quantity of NIINs Listed on DDNB PSL  
(after NAVSUP, 2014) 
Figure 7 shows the percentage of SRC listed items on each PSL. There is a 
decreasing trend in the number of SRC items listed; however, it was very surprising to 
see that on average 80 percent of the NIINs on the PSL were selected by the SRC process 
and recommended for enclosure in the DDNB PSL. We anticipated the DLA EMQ model 
would drive most of the items stocked, leading to a small percentage of SRC items on the 
PSL. However, the opposite is true. There are more items on the PSL selected by the 
Navy’s SRC selection process than the DLA EMQ selection process. 
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Figure 7.  The Percentage of SRC listed NIINS on DDNB PSL  
(after NAVSUP, 2014) 
E. FIFTH FLEET DEMAND DATA 
Demand data was obtained from NAVSUP GLS and contains two years of 
demand data for the Fifth Fleet AOR. It includes any requisition that was requested by a 
unit operating in the AOR, to include deployed units and units stationed OCONUS. The 
data set contains 410,929 individual requisitions and spans from March 2012 to February 
2014. The weights of the NIINs requested range from under 0.1 pounds to 32,360 
pounds, and size ranged from less than one cubic foot to 269 cubic feet. The heaviest 
item requisitioned weighed 32,360 pounds and was a ship propeller, NIIN 
2010012480377. The largest item requisitioned was 269 cubic feet, NIIN 
4920013459714, a motion convertor encoder. The most valuable item requisitioned, in 
terms of monetary value, was an air reeling machine, NIIN 1680015106774, with a unit 
price of $381,451. Of the 410,929 requisitions, 34,167 had required delivery dates of 999 
and 169,554 had a required delivery date of 777. Figure 8 shows the percentage of 
requisitions that had 999 and 777 for the required delivery date for all requisitions and 
only those that were listed on the PSL. In both situations, requisitions with 999 and 777 
appear to make up approximately 50 percent of the total requisitions.  
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Figure 8.  Percentage of High Priority Requisitions  
(after NAVSUP, 2014) 
We also created an AAC breakdown chart for the demand data to look for 
differences in proportions in each type, see Figure 9.  Acquisition advice code D, DOD 
integrated material managed, made up a large portion of the total AAC on the demand 
data with only PSL NIINs. This is in line with what would be expected for items forward 
staged and managed by DLA. There were nine percent of the PSL requisitions that did 
not have an ACC of C, D, J, V, and Z, which can be attributed to the DLA EMQ NIIN 
selection process.  
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Figure 9.  AAC Breakdown (after NAVSUP, 2014) 
We sorted the demand data to only list the items that were on the DDNB PSL 
from March 2012 to February 2014. We then created a frequency chart for the various 
modes of shipment, see Figure 10. Appendix D has a list of all the shipment code 
explanations along with the individual frequency for each method. Air Small Package 
Carrier, code J, was the highest used shipment method of the PSL items. This shipment 
method accounted for 29 percent of the total shipments. The second most used method is 
via the Air Mobility Command, code F, which accounted for 16 percent of the total 
shipments. The third most used shipment method is via local delivery, code 9, which 
accounted for 15 percent of the shipments. Items that were locally delivered means the 
item was pulled from the DDNB warehouses or some other warehouse in Bahrain. 
SEAVAN and Surface Small Carrier, code U and 5, came in fourth and fifth in the 
frequency of use. The column labeled “Blank” represent requisitions in which the 
shipment mode field was not filled out. 
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Figure 10.  Shipment Mode Frequency (after NAVSUP, 2014) 
Another way to look at the frequency information is to put the methods into three 
categories of air transportation, surface transportation, and forward staged assets. There 
were 1,391 data points that had a blank in the shipment method column, so these items 
were excluded from one of the three categories because there is no way for us to 
determine the actual mode of shipment for these items. In addition, there were two 
reserved categories that could not be directly linked to a particular shipment method, so 
those requisitions were excluded from a category assignment. Table 2 shows the 
frequency for each of the three categories. Over 52 percent of the Fifth Fleet requisitions 
were filled by air transportation, followed by 25 percent filled by sea transportation, and 
finally 23 percent filled by NIINs forward staged. 







We graphed the percentage of depot level repairables (DLR) that were designated 
as a PSL item and demanded in the last two years. Figure 11 shows that of all the PSL 
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items requisitioned only three percent made up the total. Of that three percent, 76 percent 
were labeled as a 7H COG. All of the listed COGs are associated with shipboard DLRs. 
 
Figure 11.  DLR Percentage and Breakdown (after NAVSUP, 2014) 
Looking at the demand data as a whole, there are 11 requisitions that were 
received before the items were ordered. This could be because of an error in inputting the 
requisition or if the item was ordered offline. In addition, there were 119 requisitions 
submitted but not received. Thirty-six requisitions were backordered, and 77 were 
cancelled. The shortest lead time from the date an item was ordered to the date it was 
received was less than one day. The longest lead time was 720 days. The average lead 
time of the data set was 38.71 days. The frequency of the lead times from when the 
requisition was placed to when the NIIN was received for the entire data set were 
graphed in Figure 12. A small portion of the NIINs were shipped and received within five 
days. Most of the lead times were between six to 40 days. The frequency of leads times 
greater than 182 days was relatively minimal.  
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Figure 12.  Frequency of Lead Times in Days for Full Data Set  
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III. COST ANALYSIS 
In this chapter, we report findings of a cost analysis conducted on the forward 
staging process at DDNB. The data was analyzed in various stages, starting with the DLA 
air and surface shipments. This data was analyzed for only NIINs listed on the PSLs, and 
then the analysis was conducted on the entire data set. A cost analysis was conducted on 
the Fifth Fleet demand history for only NIINs listed on the PSLs and then for the entire 
data set. Requisition numbers are not listed in the DLA data, so there was no way for us 
to combine the two data sets. It is possible that some of the shipments in the DLA data 
are also in the two-year demand data; however, because we had no means to connect the 
two data sets we analyzed them separately. This analysis provides NAVSUP a 
quantitative analysis of the methods used to fill customer demand in relation to the 
forward staging efforts. 
A. ASSUMPTIONS 
We had the following assumptions when developing and using our cost analysis 
equation. 
1. The surface shipping rates will only change at the beginning of a new 
fiscal year. This assumption facilitates using only one rate per fiscal year. 
2. Items listed on the Bahrain PSL that were air shipped were done so 
because the items were not in stock at the DDNB warehouse. 
3. Items shipped via air transportation were done to meet the customers’ 
required delivery dates, and therefore could not be shipped by surface 
transportation. 
4. The holding cost does not include any financial opportunity costs. 
5. We ignore any special handling or cube cost and use NIIN weight as the 
only factor when calculating costs. 
6. Requisitions with a mode of shipment code 2, 5, G, M, V, and Z will be 
considered to have been shipped via surface shipment. 
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7. Requisitions with a mode of shipment code of 4, 6, and F will be 
considered to have been shipped via military air shipment. 
8. Requisitions with a mode of shipment code of 7, H, J, and Q will be 
considered to have been shipped via commercial air shipment. 
9. Requisitions with a mode of shipment code of 9, A, B, D, E, I, S, and X 
will be considered to have been issued from Bahrain. 
B. GENERAL EQUATION 
The general equation  used in our cost analysis is as follows: 
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TypeCost  = Cost of forward staging material. Subscript denotes what type of cost is 
being calculated. 
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[ ]DataSource
iSurface = Surface shipping costs. Superscript denotes what data source 
was used to calculate the surface shipment cost. 
[ ]DataSource
iHold = Navy holding cost for DDNB warehouse. Superscript denotes 
what data source was used to calculate the holding cost. 
[ ]DataSource
iAir = Air shipment costs. Superscript denotes what data source was used 
to calculate the air shipment cost. 
This equation calculates the aggregate cost of forward positioning material. The 
equation is flexible in that it can be used to calculate the historic cost or what the cost 
would have been given a set of selected NIINs. In addition, it can be modified to 
calculate the cost difference between shipping items via surface shipping and paying a 
holding cost less the cost of shipping items via air shipment. 
C. CALCULATIONS AND ANALYSIS 
1. DLA Air and Surface Shipments Analysis with Only PSL NIINs 
First, we wanted to see how much DLA has charged the Navy for forward 
positioning material from March 2012 to February 2014. To do this, we filtered the DLA 
surface shipment data for only those NIINs that were listed on the DDNB PSLs. We then 
multiplied the filtered NIIN weights by the yearly surface shipment rates and summed the 
values. This gave us how much DLA has charged the Navy for sending NIINs selected 
for forward staging via surface transportation which was $1,781,827.97. We ensured the 
NIIN weights were multiplied by the appropriate fiscal year shipping rate. In addition, we 
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omitted ten data points because their weights dictated that they would have to be shipped 
via surface transportation regardless of forward staging efforts and should be excluded 
from our calculations. A NIIN was omitted if it exceeded 45,000 pounds, which is the 
maximum payload capacity of a C-130 aircraft.  
We then filtered the DLA air shipment data for only those NIINs that were listed 
on the DDNB PSLs. We summed the individual air shipment charges for the filtered data, 
which totaled $481,110.05. This is the amount the Navy was charged by DLA for 
shipping NIINs on the PSLs to Bahrain via air transportation. Finally, we added the 
surface and air transportation totals to the DDNB holding cost. The total forward staging 
cost charged to the Navy by DLA is $2,662,424.61. Below is the equation we used for 
our calculation. 
5,930 6,66424
[( ) ] [( ) ] [( ) ]
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( ) $1,781,827.97+$399,486.59+$481,110.05 $2,662,424.61Actual DLACost    
Next, we wanted to see what it should have cost if all PSL NIINs were shipped 
via surface transportation. This is the best case scenario and is the situation the forward 
positioning effort is aiming to achieve because surface shipping costs are significantly 
lower than air transportation costs. To calculate what it would have cost to ship NIINs via 
surface transportation that were actually shipped via air transportation, we used the 
filtered list we made for the air shipment data and then multiplied the NIIN weights by 
the appropriate surface shipping rate. The summed charges came out to $97,614.35. This 
is the amount it would have cost to ship the PSL NIINs in the air shipment data by 
surface transportation. We added the previous surface shipping cost and the holding cost 
to this amount and came out with a total of $2,278,928.91. This is the lowest cost the 
Navy could have incurred from DLA for forward positioning material in the Fifth Fleet 
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AOR based off the PSL NIINs shipped. Below is the equation we used for our 
calculation. 
6,664 5,930 24
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( ) $97,614.35 $1,781,827.97+$399,486.59 $2,278,928.91BestCase DLACost     
The difference between Cost Actual(DLA) and Cost BestCase(DLA) is $383,495.70, which 
is the premium the Navy paid to have material expedited via air transportation to meet 
customer needs. The Navy would have saved a fair amount of money if the NIINs in the 
DLA air shipment data were in stock at the DDNB warehouse and had been sent via 
surface shipping instead of air shipped. Typically the items were air shipped because they 
were out of stock in the DDNB warehouse and were required immediately; or the items 
were listed on the PSL, but not yet stocked at the warehouse.  
The actual air shipment costs and the best case cost were graphed side by side for 
comparison purposes, see Figure 13. The difference between the two columns is equal to 
$383,495.70. DLA chose to air ship a significant amount of material rather than send it 
by surface for items that should have been stocked at DDNB. The material shipped was a 
combination of NIINs to fill the COCO warehouse and NIINs to fill immediate customer 
demand. The air shipments costs were paid for by the Navy. 
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Figure 13.  Actual Cost versus Best Case Cost (after DLA, 2014) 
Next, we calculated what the charges would be for forward staging the PSL 
NIINs, best case scenario, versus shipping all PSL NIINs via air transportation and not 
forward staging. To calculate what it would have cost to ship the PSL NIINs in the DLA 
surface shipment data by air transportation, we filtered the DLA surface shipment data 
for only PSL NIINs and then multiplied the NIIN weights by the average yearly air 
shipping rate. The shipping rates were calculated using the DLA air shipment data. The 
cube sizes of the NIINs were not used in calculating the average rate. The data suggests 
that NIIN weight is the primary driver of the air transportation costs. To verify this, we 
conducted a regression on the air shipment charges using weight as an independent 
variable. The probability value of the test statistic is zero, and the coefficient of 
determination was .82. These two factors verify that using weight alone to calculate a 
shipping rate is satisfactory. Below is the equation we used to calculate the cost 
difference. 
6,664 5,930 24
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( ) ($97,614.35 $1,781,827.97 $399,486.59)
($481,110.05 11,617,573.45) $9,819,754.59
Difference DLACost   
     
 
Based off the above calculation, theoretically if the Navy had shipped the items 
listed on the PSL via air shipment, it would have cost the Navy $9,819,754.59 more than 
if the NIINs were sent via surface transportation and forward positioned. By forward 
positioning material, it is saving the Navy a significant amount of money and improves 
NIIN lead times. The ability to issue directly from the warehouse saves two to three days 
in air transportation time. The saved time will decrease equipment down time and 
improve mission readiness. 
The cost to expedite all PSL NIINs via air transportation and the cost to forward 
position the material were graphed side by side to get a visual comparison, see Figure 14.   
The cost to expedite all PSL NIINs and not forward position material is significantly 
higher than the cost to forward position the material and ship via surface transportation. 
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Figure 14.  Expedited Delivery versus Forward Positioning, DLA Data 
Set (after DLA, 2014) 
2. DLA Air and Surface Shipment Analysis with Non-PSL NIINs 
We also analyzed all non-PSL NIINs shipped from DLA to identify a target of 
opportunity for the Navy to save on transportation costs for NIINs shipped by DLA that 
were not selected for forward positioning. We filtered the DLA air shipment data for only 
non-PSL NIINs and multiplied the weights by the surface shipping charge rate. We then 
summed the values and subtracted the total air charges for non-PSL NIINs, which came 
out to -$8,660,942.61. We used the below equation in our calculation. 
218,456 218,456


























 ( ) $2,069,629.58 $10,730,572.19 $8,660,942.61Opportunity DLACost     
Over the course of two years, the Navy paid an additional $8,660,942.61 to have 
required non-PSL NIINs shipped to Bahrain through DLA. This is the premium that the 
Navy paid to meet customer demand on time and support mission readiness and 
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operational commits. We graphed the monthly cost of the air shipments and the monthly 
cost of the calculated surface shipping cost over time. Figure 15 shows the additional 
amount paid to expedite orders and meet customer demand. The light blue area represents 
the target of opportunity for the Navy to save money in transportation charges. 
 
Figure 15.  Actual Air Costs versus Calculated Surface Transportation 
Costs for Non-PSL NIINs (after DLA, 2014) 
Additionally, we calculated what percentage of the total air shipment data was 
attributed to items that were listed on DDNB PSL. The results indicate that only a small 
fraction of the items shipped, four percent, were items designated for forward staging and 
most of the air shipment costs were attributed to items that were ordered to fill customer 
requirements that did not qualify the NIIN to become a part of the PSL. Figure 16 is 
visual representation of the percentage of PSL air transportation costs in relation to the 
total air transportation costs. 
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Figure 16.  PSL Versus Non-PSL Air Transportation Costs (after DLA, 
2014) 
Although the forward staging effort is saving the Navy money, the fact that there 
are 22 times more NIINs being shipped by air transportation than the amount of items 
designated for forward staging means there is significant target of opportunity for 
increasing forward staging efforts. 
3. Fifth Fleet Demand Data Analysis with Only PSL Items 
Utilizing the second set of data provided, we conducted a cost analysis based off 
all customer demand in the Fifth Fleet AOR for any NIIN on the DDNB PSL. The data 
set contained all NIINs requisitioned so we filtered the data for only those NIINs that 
were listed on a DDNB PSL for the last 24 months. In theory, these items should have 
been issued from the DDNB warehouse and not shipped via air transportation. As we saw 
earlier, only 25 percent of the requisitions ordered were filled by forward staged supplies. 
To calculate the total cost associated with PSL NIINs listed on the demand data, we used 
the following equation. 
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6,086 5,173 24






















































(2 ) $43,547.51 $35, 421.36 $399, 486.59 543,172.07
$1,021,627.53
Actual YrDmdCost    
  
The total shipping and forward staging cost of NIINs listed on the Bahrain DDNB 
PSL is $1,021,627.53, using the two-year demand data set and holding cost data set. The 
holding costs make up 41 percent of the total cost, see Figure 17.  
 
Figure 17.  PSL Cost Breakdown (after NAVSUP, 2014) 
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To find out what the theoretical cost savings would be using only the PSL demand 
data, we first multiplied the PSL NIINs by the average yearly shipping rates for air and 
surface transportation. These values represent what transportation cost would have been 
if all the PSL NIINs were shipped by air and if they were all shipped by surface. We used 
the following equation to calculate the savings. 
6,086 14,657
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(2 ) $34,181.76 $64,046.27 $35,421.36 $399,486.59
$533,135.98
BestCase YrDmdCost    
  
If all the PSL NIINs listed in the two-year demand data were shipped via surface 
transportation and forward positioned as originally intended, the cost would be 
$533,135.98. This is the best case scenario for the Navy and would have been the 
approximate cost if the PSL NIINs were in stock at the DDNB warehouse. Unfortunately, 
14,657 PSL NIINs were shipped by air transportation because they were out of stock in 
the DDNB warehouse and required immediately or the items were listed on the PSL, but 
not yet stocked at the warehouse. The difference between Cost Actual(2YrDmd) and Cost 
BestCase(2YrDmd) is $488,491.55. This is the premium the Navy paid over two years to get 
items that should have been forward staged air shipped from CONUS to meet immediate 
customer demands. The premium is 49 percent of the actual forward staging cost. 
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Finally, we calculated what it would have cost to ship all the PSL NIINs listed in 
the two-year demand data set by air transportation and not forward position material in 
Bahrain. We used the below equation. 
14,657 6,086
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(2 ) ($64,046.27 $34,181.76 $35,421.36 $399,486.59)
($543,172.07 $293,166.80 $302,061.39) $605,264.28
Difference YrDmdCost    
      
Theoretically, the forward positioning of material in the Fifth Fleet AOR would 
save the Navy $605,264.28 over the course of two years based of the demand data. This 
is a substantial amount of money; however, it is not as large of a savings as that 
calculated using the DLA shipment data. The primary cause of the difference between the 
two values is the average weight of the NIINs shipped in the DLA data is significantly 
higher than the average weight of the NIINs in the two-year demand data. 
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The cost to expedite all PSL NIINs via air transportation and the cost to forward 
position all PSL NIINs were graphed side by side to get a visual comparison, see Figure 
18.  The cost to expedite all PSL NIINs and not forward position material is significantly 
higher than the cost to forward position all PSL NIINs and ship via surface 
transportation. 
 
Figure 18.  Expedited Delivery versus Forward Positioning, Two-Year 
Demand Data Set (after NAVSUP, 2014) 
4. Fifth Fleet Demand Data Analysis with Non-PSL NIINs 
Finally, we wanted to see what the target of opportunity was for forward 
positioning NIINs that were not previously selected by the EMQ and SRC process in the 
two-year demand data set. We filtered the data to only include non-PSL NIINs and then 
multiplied the NIIN weights by the surface shipping rate and then for the air shipping 
rate. We summed the surface shipping costs and the air shipping costs and then 






























(2 ) $973,009.48 $8,756,916.24 $7,783,906.76Opportunity YrDmdCost      
Over the course of two years, the Navy has paid a premium of $7,783,906.76 to 
have NIINs not selected for forward staging to be shipped via air transportation in order 
to meet customer demands. This is a large opportunity to save the Navy money by 
increasing forward staging efforts. We graphed the cost to ship PSL and non-PSL NIINs 
via air transportation for comparison purposes, see Figure 19. The PSL air transportation 
cost only makes up six percent of the total air transportation cost in the Bahrain data, 
which is a sign that forward staging efforts are working but should be better enforced. 
The remaining 94 percent represents the target of opportunity for the Navy to save on 
transportation costs by increasing the amount of NIINs that are forward positioned. There 
is a delicate balance to ensure the maximum amount of material is forward staged while 
not significantly reducing the availability of material available CONUS and in other 
AORs. 
 
Figure 19.  PSL Versus Non-PSL Air Transportation Costs  
(after NAVSUP, 2014) 
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D. ANALYSIS SUMMARY 
The analysis shows that the Navy paid a premium of $399,486 to have items that 
were listed on the PSL shipped via air transportation that should have been issued from 
the DDNB if it were fully stocked. The premium is relatively small compared to the total 
forward staging cost savings of $9,819,754 associated with DLA shipped items. When 
the two-year demand data set is used to calculate the cost savings it comes out to a 
savings of $605,264 which is significantly lower than when the DLA data sets are used. 
The primary driver of this cause is that the DLA surface shipping data set contains NIINs 
that are much heavier and as a result when their weights are multiplied by the air shipping 
rate the total cost comes out much higher. In either case the current forward staging 
efforts are saving the Navy funding. In addition, both data sets show there is a significant 
target of opportunity for NIINs not listed on the PSL. 
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IV. LEAD TIME ANALYSIS 
In the previous chapter, we discussed the financial impacts of the forward staging 
process. In this chapter, we will analyze the savings in time, specifically lead time. For 
the purpose of this study, we consider lead time to be the number of days in between the 
date of initial order and the date the item was received, or in other words, customer wait 
time after placing a requisition. It should be noted that some of the days in between initial 
order and receipt are caused by administrative delays rather than merely shipping, but the 
lead time we used is all inclusive in order to capture the reality of the process from the 
customer point of view.  
In order to study the effects of the forward staging policy in the Fifth Fleet with 
regard to the DDNB COCO warehouse, we looked at two time periods: first, a time 
period prior to the standup of the COCO warehouse, and next, a relatively equal 
timeframe after the PSL build up and the availability of the COCO warehouse at DDNB. 
Of note, at the time of this study, the DDNB has not yet been fully stocked with all PSL 
items and allowances. For this reason, we highly recommended this study be performed 
again after the warehouse has been fully stocked and functional for at least six months. 
However, we will show this data are already showing a significant reduction in lead time. 
We have determined three ways in which to study the overall impact of forward 
staging on the Fifth Fleet customers. First, we will look at overall lead time during the 
two time periods. Next, we will analyze differences in lead time length categories. 
Finally, we will analyze differences in lead time caused by seasonality of fiscal quarters. 
A. DATA SELECTION 
We used the same Fifth Fleet demand data from April 2012 through March 2014, 
obtained from NAVSUP GLS, as discussed for the financial impact study in Chapter III 
(NAVSUP, 2014). However, for the lead time analysis, we are only concerned with the 
items that will be stocked as part of the PSL in support of the forward staging effort. It 
should be noted that the PSL is frequently updated and modified according to demand by 
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the DLA EMQ model and the Navy’s SRC process (Defense Logistics Agency, 2013). 
This study was conducted using the PSL as of March 2014, which contains 75,577 
requisitions from the Fifth Fleet.  
In order to more closely examine the effects of forward staging the PSL, we 
further classified the data into two categories: (1) before and (2) after initial DDNB PSL 
implementation. We wanted to capture demand data during the same general time of 
year, in order to prevent any possible seasonality differences. We also wanted to capture 
the most recent effects, so we used the latest PSL demand information within our data 
set. Lastly, we wanted the data from the two categories to have the same number of 
requisitions, so that even though our date ranges are not identical, our sample sizes are. 
Similar sample sizes over different time periods could possibly confound the study results 
due to a greater workload during one period, which would theoretically increase lead time 
due to capacity constraints; however, we negate that confound in our workload 
comparison. For these reasons, our first category, pre-DDNB PSL, consists of 3,919 
requisitions between February 1, 2013 and March 31, 2013; the second category, after the 
initial PSL build up and COCO warehouse standup, consists of 3,919 requisitions 
between January 15, 2014 to March 31, 2014.  
B. OVERALL LEAD TIME IMPACT  
In the past two years, requisition lead time in the Fifth Fleet has significantly 
decreased, by 29–41 percent depending on how it is measured. The average lead time of 
the PSL items during the entire two years of demand data is 31.5 days. For the three 
months of data we have available for 2014, the requisition lead times dropped to 12.89 
days on average, which is the 41 percent decrease.  
A comparison of identical sample sizes produces a more conservative, but still 
impressive, 29 percent savings in average lead time. This data comes from the previously 
described sample timeframe categories consisting of 3,919 requisitions during the periods 
of February 1 to March 31, 2013, pre-DDNB COCO warehouse forward positioning, 
compared to the same number of requisitions taken from January 15 to March 31, 2014, 
post-initial PSL build-up. The former time period had an average 44.12-day lead time 
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compared to the later period’s 12.89-day average. These differences are statistically 
significant (T-stat= 34.15, P-value<0.000). 
Figure 20 visually depicts the reduction in PSL lead times over the course of only 
one year during which the DDNB began forward staging efforts. 
 
Figure 20.  Comparative PSL Lead Times 2013 and 2014 Periods  
(after NAVSUP, 2014) 
In order to provide a more useful analysis, we also studied the frequency of which 
the lead times occur. In order to do so, we divided the data into eight logical lead time 
categories. The categories we created range from greater than one year down to less than 
one week. We calculated the frequency of occurrences in each category for both the 2013 
PSL data set (Figure 21) and the 2014 PSL data set (Figure 22), and then we overlapped 
the two data sets for comparison (Figure 23). See charts and key points below. 
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Figure 23.  2013 and 2014 PSL Lead Time Comparison  
(after NAVSUP, 2014) 
As Figure 23 shows with the side-by-side comparison, lead times were 
significantly improved in the 2014 data set. Lead times greater than three months were 
completely eliminated. Lead times less than one and two weeks increased by a combined 
91 percent, which shows that shorter lead times were more prevalent in the post-PSL 
build-up time period. A summary of improvement highlights are listed in Table 3. 
Table 3.   Key Points from 2013 and 2014 Lead Time Comparison  
(after NAVSUP, 2014) 
 
 
Key Points 01Feb‐31Mar 2013 15Jan‐31Mar 2014 Improvements
Longest lead time 399 days 80 days 319 days
Lead time occurences >1 year 10 0 10
Lead time occurences >3 months 522 0 522
% lead times >2 months 25% 6% 19%
% lead times <2 weeks 19% 93% 74%
% lead times <1 week 17% 34% 17%
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C. WORKLOAD COMPARISON 
In order to rule out the lead time reductions as a result of heavier workload, which 
generally tends to increase lead time, we isolated a single week during the 2013 data set 
and compared it to a single week in the 2014 set with nearly identical numbers of 
requisitions, 328 and 329 respectively. We then calculated the frequency of lead time 
category occurrences to ensure that workload was not a factor in the lead time reductions. 
As Figure 24 demonstrates, workload did not contribute to the decreased lead times; if 
workload had been a factor, we would have seen similar lead time category occurrences 
in the two periods.  
However, all lead time categories greater than two months were eliminated. There 
was a 62 percent decrease in the one- to two-month lead time category and a 66-percent 
decrease in the two-week to one-month category. There was an increase of 285 percent of 
lead times in the 1–2 week category and a 233 percent increase in the >1 week category. 
These differences are statistically significant (Chi Squared= 1,538, P-value<0.000). 
Therefore, the data indicates the same lead time reduction patterns as previously found in 
the larger time period differences, eliminating workload as a contributing factor.  
 
Figure 24.  Comparison of 15–21 Mar, 2013, and 19–25 Feb, 2014  
(after NAVSUP, 2014) 
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D. FISCAL QUARTER COMPARISONS 
We deduced from the one-week comparisons that workload was not a factor in 
lead time reduction. Our next concern was seasonality, specifically the pattern of lead 
time effects during fiscal quarters (FQ). In order to study the FQ impact, we divided the 
demand data into four FQs for comparison: FY12 Quarter 4, FY13 Quarter 1, FY13 
Quarter 4, and FY14 Quarter 1. We chose these quarters because 1st and 4th fiscal 
quarters have the highest budgetary impacts, which could cause longer lead times due to 
increase or lack of funding for parts and transportation. This comparison will show the 
differences in lead times across fiscal quarters as well as the pre- and post-PSL 
implementation time periods. 
 
 
Figure 25.  FY12 4th Quarter Lead Time Categories  
(after NAVSUP, 2014) 
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Figure 26.  FY13 4th Quarter Lead Time Categories  
(after NAVSUP, 2014) 
The last FQ of each year is generally when there is the least amount of funding 
available for both parts and transportation. It naturally follows that lead times will be the 
longest during these time periods, and our analysis confirms this. However, even when 
comparing FY12 4th Quarter (Pre-PSL build-up) with FY13 4th Quarter (Post-Initial PSL 
Build-up), the lead time reductions still occur. The analysis shows 1,570 fewer lead time 
occurrences greater than six months and 1,232 fewer instances of lead times between 




Figure 27.  FY13 1st Quarter Lead Time Categories  
(after NAVSUP, 2014) 
 
Figure 28.  FY14 1st Quarter Lead Time Categories  
(after NAVSUP, 2014) 
The first FQ of each year is when the new fiscal year’s budget is available; 
therefore, lead times tend to be shorter due to the funding availability. Again, our data 
supports this generality with lead times showing improvement. When we studied the 1st 
FQ lead times of the before and after PSL build-up periods, Figures 27 and 28, the lead 
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time reductions across like quarters is still apparent. The longest lead time category, 
greater than six months, was eliminated. The 3- to 6-month lead time category was 
reduced by 804 occurrences; the one- to three-month category was reduced by 1,133 
instances.  
This analysis shows that fiscal seasonality does play a role in lead times. Both 4th 
quarter time periods show longer lead times compared with both of the 1st quarter time 
periods. Conversely, the 1st quarters show lead time reductions in both instances from the 
previous quarter. Even though lead time lengths seem to follow a fiscal-seasonal pattern, 
lead times were still reduced overall. Lead time occurrences over six months were 
reduced over the quarters and then eliminated. Table 4 summarizes the lead time category 
frequencies shown in Figures 25–28. 
Table 4.   Fiscal Quarter Lead Time Category Frequency  







Lead Time Category FY12 Q4 FY13 Q4 FY13 Q1 FY14 Q1
>6 months 11% 2% 2% 0%
3‐6 months 18% 15% 13% 6%
1‐3 months 26% 28% 23% 15%
2‐4 weeks 17% 20% 21% 27%
1‐2 weeks 16% 22% 26% 29%
<1 week 11% 13% 15% 23%
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V. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Admiral Greenert has made operating forward and maintaining a strategic 
presence one of his three primary tenants. In order to meet this requirement, the Navy has 
forward staged mission-critical material to meet immediate customer demand and lower 
equipment downtime. NAVSUP has been assigned the primary responsibility for 
developing and managing forward staging policies and procedures. They leveraged DLA 
to develop an EOQ variant model to identify key material to be staged in the Fifth Fleet 
AOR. In addition, NAVSUP developed a SRC selection process to compliment the EOQ 
variant model, which gives them the ability to set their own parameters for selecting 
forward staged NIINs that are Navy specific. The aim of this research project was to 
determine the cost effectiveness of forward positioning material in the Fifth Fleet AOR 
and determine if the efforts have saved the Navy money. In addition, the project analyzes 
the impact to lead time before and after the standup of the COCO warehouse in Bahrain. 
Even though the portion of NIINs on the Bahrain PSL only makes up a small 
percentage of the total NIINs requisitioned, there is still a strong argument for continuing 
to increase forward staging efforts. The first reason is that the current forward staging 
efforts in the Fifth Fleet in aggregate are saving the Navy approximately $605K to $4.9M 
yearly depending on which data set is analyzed. The funding saved from forward staging 
efforts can be used for other critical programs and initiatives. The Navy’s share of the 
holding cost is relatively small when compared to how much money is saved by shipping 
NIINs via surface transportation instead of by expedited air. 
The second reason is the customer wait time is decreased by 29 percent when the 
item is pulled directly off the shelf and can be immediately issued to a unit in-port or 
quickly flown to a unit operating in the AOR. Typically air shipments take between two 
to three days to have an item flown from CONUS to Bahrain while surface shipments can 
take several months. Critical parts need to be available for immediate issue to the 
requesting unit in order to maintain a high level of readiness. There are several situations 
in which shipping a NIIN via air from CONUS is too slow and the unit requires the part 
to be forward staged and issued immediately to meet mission requirements.  
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Having NIINs forward staged gives logistics readiness officers more options and 
a greater flexibility to get the item to the requesting unit at the specific time they need it. 
Twenty-five percent of the time, the DDNB was able to fill a requisition with forward 
staged NIINs. This is a low fill rate; however, because of the large forward staging 
efforts, we anticipate this figure to increase dramatically over the next few years as more 
and more PSL NIINs arrive at the DDNB warehouse.  
The main results from the cost analysis are: 
1. Over the course of two years the Navy paid an additional $8,660,942.61 to 
have required non-PSL NIINs shipped to Bahrain through DLA. 
2. Only a small fraction of the items shipped in the DLA data set, 4 percent, 
were items designated for forward staging, and most of the air shipment 
costs were attributed to items that were ordered to fill customer 
requirements that did not qualify the NIIN to become a part of the PSL. 
3. The total shipping and forward staging cost of NIINs listed on the Bahrain 
DDNB PSL based on the Bahrain demand data is $1,021,627.53. 
4. The Navy paid a $488,491.55 premium, over two years, to get items that 
should have been forward staged air shipped from CONUS to meet 
immediate customer demands. 
5. Over the course of two years, the Navy has paid a premium of 
$7,783,906.76 to have NIINs not selected for forward staging to be 
shipped via air transportation in order to meet customer demands. 
6. If the NIINs in the DLA data set had been in stock and issued from the 
DDNB warehouse, the Navy would have saved $383,495.70 over the 
course of two years 
7. Theoretically, if the Navy had shipped the items listed on the PSL via 
surface shipment and paid the monthly holding cost fee in aggregate the 
forward staging process would have saved the Navy $9,819,754.59, 
compared to just shipping everything via air transportation based off the 
DLA data set. 
8. Theoretically, the forward positioning of material in the Fifth Fleet AOR 
would save the Navy $605,264.28 based off the Bahrain two year demand 
data.  
The lead time analysis shows substantial savings in lead time days and even 
greater improvement in lead time categories. We believe the 29 percent reduction in 
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overall lead time averages and the lead time category improvements are a direct result of 
the forward staging efforts in the Fifth Fleet at the DDNB warehouse. We conclude that 
these reductions in lead time and improvement in lead time categories will continue to 
improve as the DDNB warehouse finishes stocking the PSL. We recommend a further 
study be conducted in 18 months to test these assumptions and monitor future lead times 
to validate the sustained improvements. 
The main results from the lead time analyses are: 
1. The DDNB PSL build-up shows a 29 percent improvement in lead time 
with the average lead time reduction of 31.23 days between 2013 and 
2014 time periods studied. 
2. Although overall number of requisitions decreased from 2013 to 2014, we 
confirmed that workload was not a factor in the lead time reduction. 
3. Lead times greater than 3 months have been completely eliminated. The 
improvement in longest lead time was a reduction of 319 days; the longest 
lead time in our post-PSL build-up data set was 80 days. 
4. Lead time in all categories greater than 1 month have been reduced, and 
lead times less than 1 and 2 weeks have a combined increase of 91%. 
5. Lead times are a function of fiscal quarter seasonality; however, overall 
improvements from quarter-to-quarter and during like-quarter 
comparisons support the trend of lead time savings due to the PSL 
implementation. 
 
The March 2014 PSL containing 75,577 items comprised only 18 percent of the 
total Fifth Fleet demand between April 2012 and March 2014. As the PSL is 
continuously updated through DLA’s EMQ model and the Navy’s SRC process, we also 
predict that the PSL will grow more robust, thereby incorporating a larger portion of Fifth 
Fleet demand in the future and providing shorter lead times in general across the AOR.  
A. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
The efforts to forward position material in the Fifth Fleet AOR are working by 
meeting the CNO’s guidance and saving the Navy money while lowering associated lead 
times to the war fighter. The Navy has considered several other options to forward stage 
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material in the Fifth Fleet AOR resulting in improved lead times and higher material 
availability, and our analysis can aid in deciding among courses of action (COA). There 
is a significant amount of room to expand the forward staging efforts in Bahrain by 
incorporating a greater number of NIIN’s in the DDNB COCO warehouse or by 
following one of the COAs mentioned above. The concern with expanding too much is 
that there is a possibility that parts availability might start to become restricted for units 
operating CONUS or in other AORs because selected NIINs will be positioned forward. 
The right balance of forward positioned NIINs needs to be attained that is not only cost 
efficient but also supports each COCOM needs without having to buy additional stock. 
We recommend that another analysis be conducted in 12 to 18 months on the 
forward staging efforts in the Fifth Fleet AOR. This would allow ample time for the 
COCO warehouse to be fully stocked; therefore, the analysis could encompass a greater 
span of time. In addition, we recommend that the other AORs be similarly analyzed to 
verify their cost effectiveness and improvements in lead times. 
Finally, although not reported here, during our research we discovered that 
backorder rates as well as backorder lead times have also been significantly reduced 
during this time period, with an overall reduction of approximately 10 percent from 2013 
to 2014. Because backorders are theoretically not increased or reduced by forward 
staging, we were not able to further analyze this improvement and stay within the scope 
of this thesis. There are several possible causal factors that we identified but could not 
isolate, including but not limited to: the off-loading of the USS Ponce material, an 
initiative to increase asset visibility, or any number of new policies affecting the naval 
supply system. We recommend that further analysis be conducted to study and possibly 
further improve the number, rate, and lead times of backorders. 
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APPENDIX A. MAP OF NAVAL FORCES CENTRAL COMMAND  
 





THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 
  61
APPENDIX B. SELECTED ACQUISITION ADVICE CODE 
DEFINITIONS 
C - Service/Agency regulated. These NIINs have no special restrictions affecting 
their issue, shipment, or transfer other than those imposed by the agency policy. 
D–DOD integrated material managed, stocked, and issued. These NIINs have no 
special restrictions affecting their issue, shipment, or transfer other than those 
imposed by Integrated Material Management (IMM) or the agency policy. 
J–Not stocked but centrally managed by IMM. Once the requisition is received 
the procurement will be initiated. 
V–Terminal item. The NIIN is currently in inventory but further procurement is 
denied. 
Z–Insurance/numeric stockage objective item. These NIINs are ordered 
infrequently but a small quantity must be stocked because either the NIIN has a 
long lead time or is considered essential material. 
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APPENDIX C. ASSUMPTIONS, DEFINITIONS AND OTHER 
CALCULATIONS 
Other Calculations, Definitions, and Assumptions 
 SKU: An Item (NIIN) at a location. 
 SKU Build: This is the term DLA uses to encompass the overall process of how DLA Stock 
Positioning determines whether or not to create a SKU at a location. At this level, it applies to 
both CONUS and OCONUS depots. 
 Economic Movement Quantity (EMQ): This was a model that DLA created to introduce 
economics into the forward positioning decision-making process. It was based on Wilson’s 
Economic Order Quantity (EOQ) and was customized to focus on the handling, holding, 
transportation, and other costs associated 
 Demand is defined as the Sales or Order Requests (“Hits”) made for an item, whether or 
not that order was filled. In EBS it is the forecast which includes any manual 
collaborative adjustments. It is not the number issues. 
 Planned Stock List (PSL) this is PLAN that EBS has calculated. In simple terms, it’s 
the Economic Items + SRC Items. Please note that this is not an actual physical list that 
is readily available. Rather, it’s a term used to refer to those items that are activated or 
remain activated as a result of the production run; from which a list can be generated by 
query if required. 
 Constraints to the economic model: Any level calculated that would result in more 
inventory being forward positioned than is forecasted for greater than 365 days (CovDur), 
that DRP CovDur is changed and set at 365 days 
 Assumes customers’’ alignments are correct and not changeable, along with taking into 
consideration where mobile units were targeted for replenishment throughout their history, vs. 
where they are currently located. 
 As of this document date, C&T forward positioning decisions are not determined using this 
process. 
 Assumes all Item data, NIIN, CIIC, HCC, Cube, Weight, Price, UOM, etc., are correct. 
 Assumes that all required statistics and data were pulled and calculated prior to beginning the 
Economic Calculations 
 Mean Standard Error (MSE) will be calculated by EBS to track variability and be used by EBS 
to 
calculate safety stock. 
 Costs/Rates: 
 All Handling Costs are DLA Distribution Net Landed Cost (NLC) Rates with the exception of the 
ALOC rates. These are blended rates provided by DLA Distribution J8; not depot specific 
handling costs. 
 Holding Costs is assumed to be a blended 18%. Again, it is not depot specific. 
 Blended (cost/lb.) Transportation Rates by lane by shipment mode are provided by 
USTRANSCOM 
 Assumes all Restrictions are correct and will be honored. 
 Average Inventory is: AvgInv =(EMQ ÷2) +SS  
 
(Defense Logistics Agency, 2013) 
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